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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE BOYER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, and H. ROGER
BOYER dba THE BOYER COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

Case N9. 14442

E. KEITH LIGNELL and
BURTON M. TODD,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by plaintiffs to recover from
defendants a commission for broker's services rendered by plaintiffs pursuant to two agreements by the terms of which defendants retained plaintiffs to market certain realty.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following a trial of the case, the lower court entered
judgment against plaintiffs and awarded to defendants their
costs and certain discovery expenses.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
By this appeal, plaintiffs-appellants seek a reversal
of the lower court's judgment and an order directing the lower
court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellants in
the amount of $28,500.00, together with their costs incurred
below, their costs incurred on appeal, and the amounts heretofore paid by them to defendants-respondents for costs and discovery expenses pursuant to the judgment of the lower court.
^

STATEMENT OF FACTS

:

Point III, which is the core of this appeal, presents
the issue whether the lower court's finding that defendants
did not fail or refuse to cooperate with plaintiffs towards
the consummation of the sale of the subject realty is clearly
against the weight of the evidence.

Due to the nature of

Point III and because the finding of the lower court to that
effect is stated only as a conclusion and without any articulated factual basis (Finding No.6, R.194), a relatively detailed statement o'f facts is required.
Plaintiff H. Roger Boyer ("Boyer") is a Utah resident
who, since 1972 has been duly licensed by the Real Estate Division of Utah Department of Business Regulation as a real estate broker.

(Finding No.3, R.194).

The Boyer Company, a

Utah corporation, was incorporated on November 8, 1972, and

-2-
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since that time has remained in good standing.
R.193).

(Finding No. 1,

Boyer, since the inception of The Boyer Company, has

been its president and sole stockholder. (T.168-69).

Although

the lower court concluded that The Boyer Company was not properly licensed as a real estate broker (R.186-87), the Director
of the Real Estate Division of Utah testified without contradiction and the lower court tacitly recognized (R.186-87) that
The Boyer Company was duly licensed as a broker pursuant to the
prevailing and long-established practices of the Real Estate
Division. (R.186-87, T.287-88, 299).
Burton M. Todd ("Todd") and E. Keith Lignell ("Lignell")
are both dentists who, in addition to their dental practice,
engage in extensive realty investment and development together.
(T.12-13).

At all times material to this action, Todd and Lig-

nell were the owners of the Shaughnessy Apartments, a commercial apartment facility located at 251 South 700 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah. (R.14).

Todd and Lignell, because of their need

for cash in the approximate amount of $250,000.00, decided to
sell the Shaughnessy Apartments in late September of 1973, (T.
24, 258-59, Todd Depo. p.46).
On October 1, 1973, Todd and Lignell entered into a listing agreement (the "Listing Agreement11) with Boyer authorizing
Boyer to procure a sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments for the
sum of $950,000.00.

(T.14-15, Exhibit 1-P)

For the convenience

of the Court, a copy of the Listing Agreement is included
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following the main body of this brief as Exhibit "A." The
Listing Agreement rendered any sale of the apartments subject
to the approval of the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company ("Northwestern"), the holder of a mortgage upon the property, and contemplated that any purchaser would assume that
mortgage and pay to Todd and Lignell the difference between
the mortgage balance and the sales price.

Finally, the List-

ing Agreement provided that Boyer was entitled to a commission
of six percent of the sales price (amounting to $57,000.00)
upon completion of the sale and payment by the buyers of the
difference between the mortgage balance and the sales price.
(Finding No.4, R.194, Exhibit "A" hereto).
The Osmond Brothers is a singing group of national repute consisting of various children of Mr. and Mrs. George V.
Osmond, longtime residents of the State of Utah.

The Osmond

Brothers, a Utah partnership (the "Osmond Brothers") is a vehicle through which the Osmond family has conducted its investment activities.

Since early 1972, Douglas L. Callister

("Callister"), a California attorney, and Lew Costley ("Costley"), an Ogden, Utah accountant, have as a practical matter
managed the business affairs of the Osmond Brothers with only
slight involvement of the general partners of the Osmond Brothers.

(T.93-97, 113-16, Callister Depo. pp.28-32).
Between October 1, 1973 and October 11, 1973, Boyer dis-

cussed with Callister and Costley the possibility of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

Osmond Brothers purchasing the Shaughnessy Apartments, which
discussions culminated in Boyer's preparation of an Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, which was executed by
Costley on behalf of the Osmond Brothers on October 11, 1973.
(T.116-18, 132, Callister Depo. pp.8-17).

A copy of that

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (the "Earnest Money
Agreement") in its executed final form is for the convenience
of the Court included herein following the body of this brief,
as Exhibit "B." The Earnest Money Agreement, as executed by
Costley, was conditioned upon the buyer's ability to assume
Northwestern1s mortgage bearing interest at seven percent per
annum and the seller's agreement to lease the property back
from the buyers for a period of three years.
194-95, Exhibit 2-P, Exhibit "B" hereto).

(Finding No.7, R.

The Earnest Money

Agreement contained an offer to purchase the Shaughnessy Apartments for $921,500.00, with a commission in the amount of
$28,500.00 payable to The Boyer Company as broker.

Boyer had

theretofore agreed with George V. Osmond, who is also a licensed real estate broker, evenly to divide the commission from
the sale, each party to receive $28,500.00.
ter Depo. p.18).

(T.98-99, Callis-

Accordingly, the Earnest Money Agreement,

like the Listing Agreement, prescribed that Todd and Lignell
would receive a net sum after the deduction of all brokers'
commissions, of $921,500.00.

Concurrently with their execu-

tion of the Earnest Money Agreement, the Osmond Brothers
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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deposited with Boyer earnest money in the amount of $5,000.00.
(T.111-12, Exhibit 4-P). On October 11, 1973, Boyer delivered
to Todd the Earnest Money Agreement. '(T.18-19).
On October 11, 1973, Todd and Lignell discussed the
Earnest Money Agreement and Todd, in anticipation of certain
changes to the Agreement and his expected departure from Salt
Lake City, executed the document and placed his initials in
the lower right hand corner of the document.
R.195, T.66).

(Finding No.8,

On October 12, 1973, Lignell for both himself

and Todd and in the presence of Boyer deleted that portion of
the Earnest Money Agreement relating to a lease back of the
property by the sellers, initialled the deletion, signed the
document, and delivered same to Boyer.

(Finding No.9, R.195).

Boyer then returned to his office with the Earnest Money
Agreement and telephoned Callister.

After Boyer advised Callis-

ter of the changes made to the Earnest Money Agreement by Todd
and Lignell, Callister on behalf of the Osmond Brothers authorized Boyer to enter into and close the agreement as modified
by Todd and LigneU.

(T. 183-84, Callister Depo. pp. 19-22).

Within a day or two following Todd and Lignell1s execution and
modification of the Earnest Money Agreement, Boyer delivered
the modified document to Costley.

Shortly thereafter, Costley

telephoned Callister and in that conversation the two decided
that the Osmond Brothers would agree to enter into the Earnest
Money Agreement as modified.

(T.118-21).

On October 15, 1973,
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Boyer telephoned Todd and advised him that the Osmond Brothers
had accepted the Earnest Money Agreement as modified by Todd
and Lignell and desired to effect a closing as soon as possible,
(T.184-85).

Todd denied that Boyer advised him of the Osmond

Brothers1 acceptance of the modified Earnest Money Agreement,
but testified that Boyer had told him that "it could be worked
out."

(T.21-23),
Following October 12, 1973, Boyer, Callister, Costley,

and the Osmond Brothers believed that a contract had been entered into between the Osmond Brothers and Todd and Lignell
represented by the Earnest Money Agreement as modified by Todd
and Lignell.

(Callister Depo. pp.21-27, T.120-24).

Thus,

between October 12, and 15, 1973, Boyer discussed with Costley
the course that the Osmond Brothers should pursue in disposing
of certain liquid assets to procure the down payment prescribed
by the Earnest Money Agreement, and Boyer, on October 15, 1973,
requested and one day later obtained from Title Insurance Agency
an Interim Title Insurance Binder with respect to the Shaughnessy Apartments.

(T.185-186; Exhibit 9-P).

On October 15, 1973, Boyer telephoned Todd to discuss
the closing of the sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments and Todd
agreed to contact Northwestern regarding the arrangement of
the Osmond Brothers' assumption of the Northwestern loan (T.2627, 184-85).

Theodore C. MacLeod ("MacLeod"), a resident of

Denver, Colorado, is the Regional Manager of Northwestern
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and is charged with the responsibility of originating and
administrating Northwestern1s loans in Utah, among other
states.

(T.195-96, MacLeod Depo. pp.2-3).

Following his

conversation with Boyer, Todd telephoned MacLeod and discussed
in a general way the possible sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments to the Osmond Brothers, and the alternative approaches
available to effectuate an assumption of the loan by the Osmond Brothers in such a transaction.
56, T.26-28, 47-48).

(MacLeod Depo. pp.34-36,

MacLeod left the conversation

,f

with the

ball in [Todd's] court," and with MacLeod expecting Todd to
return with a concrete proposal (MacLeod Depo. p.33).

Todd,

however, testified that in this conversation, MacLeod indicated
that Northwestern would not permit the Osmond Brothers to assume the loan absent an increase in the interest rate thereof
above seven percent.

(T.27).

On October 26, 1973, Todd, Lignell, Boyer, and Earl D.
Tanner met for lunch and discussed in the framework of MacLeod's
comments the method by which an assumption of the Northwestern
loan could be arranged.

(T.189).

During that conversation,

Todd or Lignell indicated that Northwestern may require some
additional incentive to consent to the assumption of the loan
by the Osmond Brothers.

(T.190).

On October 29, 1973, Boyer

telephoned Todd, and, during that conversation, Todd indicated
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that he and Lignell were less excited about closing the sale
because of a possible tax consequence of approximately $145,
000.00,

(T.160-62, 191-92, Exhibit 10-P),

Todd, while acknow-

ledging that he advised Boyer of that tax consequence,indicated
that the tax problem did not materialize and played no role in
his decision to terminate the transaction.

(Tt160).

On October 30, 1973, Boyer, Callister and Costley met
and discussed the incentives that the Osmond Brothers would be
willing to give to induce Northwestern to allow assumption,
including prepayment of the 1974 interest on the Northwestern
loan, an increased rate of interest on a larger loan, and the
like.

Boyer relayed these potential incentives to Todd.

(T.

137-38, 194-95).
On November 2, 1973, Boyer telephoned MacLeod to determine the status of the proposed assumption.

MacLeod refused

to discuss this matter in any detail with Boyer, advising Boyer
that any such inquiry must come from Todd.

(T.196-97 and Mac-

Leod Depo. p.8). MacLeod1s understanding and practice in implementing the policies of Northwestern were neither to discuss nor consider any modification of financing arrangements
with their borrowers absent authorization from their borrower,
with whom they have privity.

Boyer then telephoned Todd and

inquired why no formal request had been directed to Northwestern
to permit assumption.

Todd promised to make such written re-

quest that day and to provide Boyer with a copy of the letter.
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(T.50-51, 197-98).

On November 7, 1973, Boyer asked Todd why

he had not yet received a copy of Todd's promised letter to
MacLeod, and Todd responded that he was awaiting MacLeod's
call concerning a possible refinancing of the Shaughnessy
Apartments and that Todd and Lignell were considering selling
another property to satisfy their cash requirements.
198-99, 259-61).

(T.152,

Todd never sent the letter that he had pro-

mised to send to MacLeod (T.50-51).

On November 11, 1973, Boyer

again telephoned MacLeod to determine the status of assumption
negotiations.

MacLeod'advised Boyer that Todd was aware of

Northwestern's position and that Boyer should direct his inquiry
to Todd.

(MacLeod Depo. pp.36-37, 59-60).

On November 16,

1973, Todd told Boyer that he and Lignell would not proceed
with a sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments.

(T.29).

Boyer re-

quested a letter to that effect from Todd which Todd prepared
on November 19, 1973, a copy of which is attached hereto for
the Court's convenience following the main body of this brief
as Exhibit "C."

(T.29, Exhibit 5-P).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING WITHOUT MODIFICATION
THE FINDINGS OF FACT PREPARED BY COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANTS AND, AT BEST, SUCH FINDINGS ARE ENTITLED TO LITTLE WEIGHT.
The lower court conducted the trial of this case between
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September 22 and 25, 1975.

On September 29, 1975, the lower

court entered its Memorandum Decision, which enunciated the
bases for its decision. (R.186-87).

Approximately one month

thereafter, counsel for defendants submitted to the lower court
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which were signed and
entered by the lower court without modification.

(R.193-97).

Plaintiffs timely moved the lower court pursuant to Rule 52(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law theretofore entered by the lower court (R.
200-05), which motion was denied in its entirety by the lower
court.

(R.215-16).

•

This Court has long maintained that

,. .
ff

[tjhe duty of mak-

ing findings and conclusions is that of the trial court.ff
Merrill v. Bailey & Sons, 99 Utah 323, 106 P. 2d 255 (1940). Indeed, that duty is expressly and absolutely imposed upon the
trial court by Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon. ] \ .
This Court has not yet spoken to the legal effect of a
trial court's mechanical adoption of the findings and conclusions
of counsel.

Other courts, however, have with good reason con-

demned the practice:
[A]ppellant?s objections were made . . . to
. . . proposed findings with which the findings of the district court are apparently
identical. We have recently asked for
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IT

brief and pertinent findings of contested
matters * * * rather than the delayed, argumentative, overdetailed documents prepared by winning counsel." [Citations
omitted]. Otherwise, we lose the benefit
of the judge's own consideration. . . ,
We stress this matter because of the
grave importance of fact-finding. The correct finding, as near as may be, of the
facts of a law suit is fully as important
as the application of the correct legal
rules to the facts found. An impeccably
lf
rightff legal rule applied to the "wrong"
facts yields a decision which is as faulty
as one which results from the application
of the "wrong" legal rule to the "right"
facts. The latter type of error, indeed,
can be corrected on appeal. But the former
• is not subject to such correction unless
the appellant overcomes the heavy burden
of showing that the findings of fact are
"clearly erroneous". . . .

The trial court is the most important
agency of the judicial branch of the government precisely because on it rests the responsibility of ascertaining the facts.
When a federal trial judge sits without a
jury, that responsibility is his. And it
is not a light responsibility; unless his
findings are "clearly erroneous", no upper
court may disturb them. To ascertain the
facts is not a mechanical act. It is a difficult art v not a science. It involves
skill and judgment. As fact-finding is a
human undertaking, it can, of course, never
be perfect and infallible. For that reason
every effort should be made to render it
as adequate as it humanly can be. United
States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942^T3
X2d Cir.), cert, denied, 316 U.S. 694 (1942).
[Footnotes omitted].
Other courts have similarly discouraged trial courts1 adoption
without modification of findings and conclusions submitted by
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counsel for the prevailing party.
Colo. 127, 464 P.2d 876 (1970).

Phillips v. Phillips, 171
(Because of the lower court's

mechanical adoption of counsel's findings, n[w]e stretch nearly
to the breaking point the presumption that the findings entered
by the court were in fact the court's own findings"); Puffin v.
Patrick, 212 Kans. 772, 512 P.2d 442 (1973).
In this case, the findings prepared by defendants' counsel, quite predictably, substantially embellished the lower
court's Memorandum Decision.

Certainly the trial court could

not have agreed with each and every one of defendants' findings.
The effect is that plaintiffs, and indeed this Court, must
speculate as to whether the findings which are challenged through
this appeal are those of the lower court or of defendants, while
defendants can steadfastly urge that the same are those of the
lower court and entitled to a presumption of propriety.
The lower court's findings come to this court endowed
with a strong presumption of propriety, requiring a showing that
the same are clearly erroneous for reversal.
son, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972).
1,1

"

Hardy v. Hendrick-

That presumption should

V

not properly attach to the findings of counsel, which are thoseof an advocate and deprive this Court of the benefit of the
lower court's thoughtful reasoning and judgment.

Plaintiffs'

concern in this respect is one of substance, for the lower court
in its Memorandum Decision made no mention of whether defendants
cooperated or refused to proceed in connection with the subject
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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transaction -- the central issue of this appeal.

Counselfs

findings, however, with no supportive factual determination,
baldly state that defendants did not fail or refuse to cooperate or proceed with the transaction.
Plaintiffs desire at this juncture to make absolutely
clear that no suggestion is made that counsel for defendants,
who are capable, honest, and ethical attorneys for whom we
have great regard and respect, have in the slightest acted improperly.

Indeed, defendants' counsel in submitting their find-

ings and conclusions merely discharged their duty as advocates.
Both on behalf of plaintiffs and as lawyers practicing law in
the State of Utah, however, we seek to make this appeal and
those that will follow the Court's decision in this case more
meaningful by ensuring that the findings that reach this Court
are those of the trial court, and not of counsel.

For the

foregoing reasons, this case should be remanded for proper findings of fact and conclusions of law by the lower court; in any
event, the findings of fact herein should not be accorded the
usual presumption^of validity in this appeal.
POINT II
THE BOYER COMPANY WAS DULY LICENSED AS A REAL
ESTATE BROKER.
In its Memorandum Decision, the lower court held:
[t]hat the corporation cannot recover because
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said corporation was not licensed as is required by Section 61-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and particularly
is this so under 61-2-18.
The Court is not unmindful of the
Utah Supreme Court decision in 29 Utah 2d,,
at page 110, State Board of Education vs.
State Board of Higher Education wherein
the Court held that long interpretations
by administrative bodies can be accepted,
in effect, as proper even though technically they are not legal. At least that
is the interpretation this Court gets from
a reading of that case.
It appeared from the evidence that
it has long been the practice of the Real
Estate Division of the Department of Business Regulation not to license corporations as brokers. However, the law is
clear and unequivocal, and the Court is
of the opinion that the corporation is
barred from recovery. (R.186-87).
Thus, while the lower court at least implicitly recognized that
The Boyer Company had been licensed in accordance with wellestablished and long standing practices of the Real Estate Division,

the lower court concluded, we believe erroneously, that

The Boyer Company was not licensed as a broker within the meaning
of the applicable statutes.
Section 61-2-18, Utah Code Annotated (Repl.1968) in substance prohibits any suit by any person, partnership, association, or corporation for recovery of a fee for services in

1/ Not surprisingly, the Findings of Fact prepared by counsel
For defendants do not include the lower court's factual finding
that it has long been the practice of the Real Estate Division
not to license corporations as brokers.
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connection with sales of realty unless such person is so licensed
as a broker at the time of such act.

It is undisputed that un-

less The Boyer Company was licensed as a real estate broker during October and November, 1973, The Boyer Company cannot maintain this action.

The issue presented by Point II is whether

The Boyer Company was so licensed.
The uncontroverted testimonial evidence offered at trial
by Stephen J. Francis, Director of the Real Estate Division of
the Utah Department of Business Regulation (the "Division") was
to the effect that the Division does hot and will hot license
corporations as such, but rather licenses as brokers only natural
persons.

(T.272-75).

According to Mr. Francis, any entity other

than a natural person becomes duly qualified to act as a broker
only when a natural person duly licensed as a broker becomes associated with the entity.

(T.272-75).

Following the Division's

approval of the association between a licensed individual and
the brokerage corporation, both the corporation in its name and
the associated individual in his name may properly act as brokers.

(T.279-82, .299).

Mr. Francis testified, and the lower

court in its Memorandum Decision found, that the foregoing has
long been and is now the practice of the Division.

(R.187, T.

284-85).
The Findings of Fact herein reflect that Boyer, an individual, at all times relevant to this case was the holder of a
valid real estate broker's license.

(Finding No.3, R.194) .
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Boyer applied for a license as broker on behalf of The Boyer Company.

(Exhibit 8-P). The Division duly granted to Boyer and

The Boyer Company a broker's license in the name of "H. Roger
Boyer dba The Boyer Company.11

(Exhibit 8-P), Mr, Francis

testified that, according to the practices of the Division, The
Boyer Company thereupon became a qualified real estate broker,
and that thereafter both Boyer and The Boyer Company could properly act as real estate brokers.

(T,287-88, 299).

In the face of the foregoing uncontroverted testimony,
the lower court concluded that The Boyer Company was not licensed
as required by Title 61, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated (Repl.
1968).

That chapter clearly contemplates that corporations may

obtain brokers' licenses, but is at best ambiguous as to the
procedure for such licensing of corporate brokers.

The only pro-

vision contained in that chapter governing the application for
or receipt of brokers' licenses by corporations provides as
follows:
(c)
Each real estate broker's license
granted to any firm, partnership, or association consisting of more than one person, or
to a corporation, shall entitle such real estate broker to designate one of its officers
or members, who upon compliance with the terms
of this chapter shall, without the payment of
any further fee, upon issuance of said broker's license, be entitled to perform all of
the acts of a real estate salesman contemplated
by this chapter. The person so designated,
however, must make application for a salesman's license, accompanying the application of
the real estate broker. If in any case the
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person so designated by a real estate broker
shall be refused a license by the commission,
or in case such person ceases to be connected
with such real estate broker, the broker shall
have the right to designate another person,
who shall make application as in the first instance. Utah Code Annotated § 61-2-9(c) (Repl.
1968),
The statute just quoted, it will be noted, does not prescribe
the method by which a corporation may obtain a broker's license
or the form to be taken by a corporate broker's license.
The statutory requirements governing all "applicants'1
for brokers1 licenses, however, cast light upon the probable
scheme contemplated by the Legislature in enacting the abovequoted section:
[T]he board of real estate examiners may require and pass upon such proof as may be
deemed necessary to determine the honesty,
integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and competency of each applicant; and shall require
the applicant to pass an examination, and prescribe the passing grade. . . . Three years'
full time experience as a real estate salesman or its equivalent shall be necessary before any applicant may apply for, and secure
a broker's license in the state of Utah.
•'* * * Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-6(a) (Repl.
1968) (Emphasis added).
V

Section 61-2-6(b) further requires that any applicant for a
broker's license shall furnish information concerning previous
and present residences, recommendations of individuals who are
acquainted with the applicant, and the like.

Based upon the

mandatory statutory requirements identified above, no corporation can ever properly be an "applicant" for a broker's license,
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since corporations cannot accomplish such uniquely human things
as take examinations, be honest, competent, or truthful, possess experience, or develop acquaintances.

It follows ines-

capably that although corporations may by statute be licensed
as brokers, only individuals may be "applicants11 for such licenses.

The issue, therefore, is whether the Divisionfs in-

terpretation and implementation of the licensing of corporate
brokers precludes the recovery of The Boyer Company,
In its Memorandum Decision, the lower court correctly
recognized that Mlong interpretations of administrative bodies
can be accepted, in effect, as proper even though they are technically incorrect."

(R.187).

In Colmari v. Utah State Land

Board, 17 Utah 2d. 14, 403 P.2d 781 (1965), this Court addressed
the issue whether the State Land Board was required by law to
accept the first bidder offering to lease oil and gas lands
or whether the Board could properly seek competitive bidding.
In resolving that question of statutory construction, the Court
strongly presumed the propriety of and adopted the statutory
interpretation of thevState Land Board:
From the dispute that has arisen over
the situation at hand, it is obvious that
our statutes leave something to be desired
as to certainty. Where such uncertainty
exists the interpretation and application
of statutes adopted by the administrative
agency is usually looked upon with some indulgence. It is both just and practical
that the Board should be allowed considerable latitude of discretion in deciding
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what policies will best carry out the responsibilities imposed upon it. Due to the considerations just stated, and because of its
experience and presumed expert knowledge in
its field, an administrative interpretation
and application of a statute, although not
necessarily controlling, is generally regarded
as prima facie correct and not to be overturned so long as it is in conformity with
the general objectives the agency is charged
with carrying out, and there is a rational
basis for it in the provisions of law, 17
Utah 2d at 19, 403 P,2d at 784. (Citations
omitted).
This Court, employing like reasoning, reached the same result
in State v. Hatch, 9 Utah 2d 288, 342 P.2d 1103 (1959).
"r~-~"a*"~"'"-*. The^isrsue here presented to the Court is virtually identical to that present in the Colman case.

As noted above, the

governing statutes here, like those in Colman, are ambiguous.
The Division here, like the Board in Colman, is vested with substantial discretion in discharging its responsibilities and
is presumed to possess expert knowledge in its field.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-5,-6 (Repl.1968).

E.g.,

Thus, the interpreta-

tion of the Division is to be "regarded as prima facie correct
and not to be overturned so long as it is in conformity with the
general objectives the agency is charged with carrying out, and
there is a rational basis for it in the provisions of law.11
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 19, 403 P.2d 781,
784 (1965).

It remains to determine whether the Division1s in-

terpretation is in conformity with the objectives of Title 61,
Chapter 2 and whether that interpretation has a rational basis
in law.
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The objects of the statutory scheme concerning brokers
are apparent both from this Court's pronouncements and from the
language of the legislation itself.

In Seal v. Powell, 9 Utah

2d 372, 345 P.2d 432 (1959), the Court observed:
[T]he real purpose of the real estate
broker's legislation . . , quite clearly
looks to the protection of the public
from dishonest or unscrupulous persons
whose business is dealing in transactions
whose objects are the consummation of
real estate deals. 9 Utah 2d at 374,
345 P.2d at 433.
Again, in Andersen v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 421, 160 P.2d 725,
727 (1945), the Court observed that the purpose of the broker
licensing statutes was "to provide for registration and regulation of those engaged in the real estate business" and "to require real estate brokers and salesmen to be 'honest, truthful
and of good reputation.'"
Consistent with the purpose of the broker licensing legislation, the Division licenses individuals who, unlike corporations, can ensure that their real estate activities and those of
entities with which they are affiliated are discharged competently, scrupulously," and honestly.

Only through association

with such a person can a corporation properly act as a broker.
By looking to some responsible individual, as Mr. Francis observed, the Division can address and presumably correct problems
encountered by others with that broker organization.

(T.266).

Thus, the Division's interpretation of the broker legislation
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is consistent with and reasonably designed to effectuate the
purposes and policies of that legislation.
Further, the Division's interpretation has a sound stasutory basis.

As noted above, only natural persons can be

"applicants11 • for broker's licenses by the very terms of the statute, but the statute also provides that corporations may be
licensed as brokers.

The statutes do not, however, explain how

a corporation that clearly cannot be an "applicant" for such a
license can nevertheless become a licensee. We submit that the
statutes discussed above can be reasonably reconciled only by
interpreting the same to permit the licensing of a corporate
broker only through some meaningful association with a duly
licensed individual.
In the event that the Court concludes that The Boyer Company was not technically a licensed broker, it must nevertheless be concluded that The Boyer Company is not precluded from
recovering herein because of its substantial compliance with
the statutory prerequisites to a broker's license.

In Piatt v.

Locke, 11 Utah 2d>273, 358 P.2d 95 (1961), this Court held that
a contractor who had substantially, although not technically,
complied with the applicable licensing requirements could properly recover pursuant to a construction contract.

There, the

contractor had not obtained a required specialty contractor1s
license on the date of the subject contract, but obtained such
license thereafter promptly upon being advised by the adminis-
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trative agency of its necessity.

The Court reasoned that a

contractor entering into a contract without knowledge of the
specialty licensing requirements should not be precluded from
recovering on that ground for honest services if he was not
guilty of a failure to act diligently in obtaining the license
after receiving notice of its necessity.
Here, a broker's license for The Boyer Company was
applied for and received in accordance with the long established
practices of the Division.

In Piatt, the Court indicated that

the contractor should not be charged with requirements of which
he had no knowledge.

Likewise here, The Boyer Company should

not be charged with requirements that diverge from the established requirements and practices of the administering agency.
Further, actual compliance with that agency's requirements must
be deemed duly diligent, substantial compliance with the applicable broker licensing requirements.

The evident purpose of

Section 61-2-18(a), to penalize those who fail to comply with
broker licensing requirements, is not served by so penalizing
those who comply with the requirements, albeit honestly erroneous, of the administering agency.

In this instance, in any

event, the statutory purpose of ensuring the integrity and
ability of brokers was fulfilled, since Todd and Lignell dealt
with only one natural person serving a broker function -Boyer, a licensed broker.
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POINT III
TODD AND LIGNELL, THROUGH THEIR BAD FAITH
REFUSAL TO COOPERATE AND CONCLUDE THE SALE,
PREVENTED THE CONSUMMATION OF THE SALE, AND
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR COMMISSION.
On appeal, the findings of the lower court will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of the
evidence or it clearly appears that the trial court misapplied
the law to the established facts.
Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972).

Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27
A review of the record.re-

. .

veals that even given this difficult standard, two findings
entered by the lower court are clearly against and contrary to
the weight of the evidence and that, indeed, the clear weight
of the evidence supports contrary findings.
Findings of Fact numbers 6 and 17 (R.194, 196) state
as follows:
6.
Defendants did not fail or refuse to •
cooperate with plaintiffs toward the consummation of the sale or otherwise block
the said sale or prevent H. Roger Boyer
from performing under the terms of the
subject listing agreement.
17. Defendants were free to terminate
their listing agreement with H. Roger
Boyer at any time without liability and
did so fairly and in good faith on the
19th day of November, 1973.
The lower court's Memorandum Decision contained no such findings,
while the Findings of Fact prepared by counsel for defendants
gratuitously included these determinations, which were adopted
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with all other such findings by the lower court.

As discussed

in detail above, these findings, being gratutiously added by
counsel for defendants, are not entitled to the deference that
would otherwise attach to a finding of the lower court.

How-

ever, a review of the evidence compels the conclusion that the
clear weight of the evidence establishes that Todd and Lignell
did in bad faith fail to cooperate towards and in fact refused
to proceed with the proposed sale.
In Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d
927 (1953), this Court addressed a case extraordinarily similar
to this case.

In Hoyt, the broker, Wasatch, entered into an

an agreement with the Hoyts, who desired to sell certain realty.
That agreement, like the Listing Agreement here, authorized the
broker to sell such realty and prescribed that the sellers were
to pay a commission if a sale was consummated,

(1 Utah 2d at

11, 261 P.2d at 927; Exhibit 1-P). Thereafter, the broker procured the Johnsons as prospective buyers, who like the Osmond
Brothers, made a down payment and signed Mthe usual printed
form Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement.11

(1 Utah 2d at 11,

261 P.2d at 927; Exhibit 2-P) . The Earnest Money Receipt and
Agreement did not prescribe the method by which the $19,000.00
balance of the purchase price was to be paid and recited:
"terms and conditions * * * subject to adjustment agreeable to
the parties."

Further, the Agreement required the sellers to

provide certain platting of the realty and procure its
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annexation to a city.

Finally, the Hoyt Earnest Money Receipt

and Agreement, like the Earnest Money Agreement here, provided that "the seller agrees, in consideration of the efforts
of the * * * [broker] in procuring a purchaser, to pay the said
* * * [broker] the rate of commission recommended by the Salt
Lake Real Estate Board."
28).

(1 Utah 2d at 11, 261.P.2d at 927-

The sellers executed the Agreement as written.

After

further negotiation, the sellers and buyers did come to an oral
agreement on the terms and time of payment of the $19,000.00
2
balance, but no formal or written contract was prepared.
Thereafter, the sellers procured the annexation to the city of
the subdivision.

The sellers testified at trial that two mat-

ters remained unresolved following the parties1 oral agreement
upon payment terms:

(1)

the sellers had not yet passed upon

the acceptability of certain other property offered by the
buyers as collateral and

(2)

the buyers had not yet posted a

bond ensuring the completion of subdivision improvements as
they had agreed to do.

The buyers had unsuccessfully attempted

to procure such a bond, but had made arrangements to obtain
another bond.

Likewise here, all that materially remained to

2/
While not identical, the situation here is closely analogous. Whereas the offer as executed in Hoyt did not create
an enforceable contract because of its uncertain and preliminary terms, as the Hoyt Court found, here the Earnest Money
Agreement as modified by Todd and Lignell constituted a counteroffer that was unexecuted but orally accepted by the Osmond
Brothers,
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be done to consummate the sale was the approval of Northwestern
3
1
of the Osmond Brothers assumption of the loan.
Shortly following annexation, but before any final contract had been submitted to the buyers, the sellers served upon
the buyers a notice reciting that unless within five days the
buyers paid the full purchase price, arranged for the installation of certain subdivision improvements, and posted the necessary bond, the sellers would consider the agreement terminated.
The buyers thereupon offered to proceed with the transaction embodied in the Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement as modified
by the subsequent oral agreement, but the sellers refused.

At

the time the buyers received such notice they, like the Osmond
Brothers, were willing and able to proceed with their agreement but, fTtheir offer met with a blanket rejection upon Hoyt!s
[the seller's] part, with no suggestion of counter-offer or
other reasonable effort to complete the transaction.11

(1 Utah

2d at 13, 261 P.2d at 929). Here, as will be shown, Todd and
Lignell refused to diligently seek the assumption of the Northwestern loan (which "only they could arrange) , and when their

3/
Todd testified that at this juncture, all that remained
to be done was (1) agreement to the deletion of the leaseback provision by the Osmond Brothers, which had already been
agreed to as will be shown below, (2) agreement by Northwestern to remove from Northwestern1s mortgage the doctors1
dental building, which Todd indicated posed no problem, as
discussed below, and (3) the negotiation of the assumption
by the Osmond Brothers of the Northwestern loan. (T.157).
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performance under the parties1 agreement was demanded, they
refused to proceed with the sale.
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Hoyt Court on two
groimds concluded that the broker was entitled to recover, notwithstanding that the subject sale had not been consummated.
First, the Court held that the seller's refusal to cooperate
and close the transaction waived the consummated sale prerequisite to the broker's commission under the listing agreement:
Under such circumstances Hoyt could not by
refusal to cooperate, defeat the defendant's
-•ywwM«ito*wa.^u right to its .commission. And we say this^,,.^^^,..,;,,^^,
advisedly, notwitstanding the finding of
the trial court, that when Hoyt originally
engaged the defendant to sell the property,
it was agreed that the commission would be
paid only if a sale were consummated.
That agreement certainly contemplated
that the plaintiff would cooperate in good
faith toward the accomplishment of the purpose for which he employed defendant. He
cannot be permitted to procure them to obtain a buyer, on terms accepted by the
plaintiff, and then prevent the accomplishment of what he requested and authorized
them to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his part of the transaction. Under
such circumstances, he will not be heard
to complain of their failure to do that
which he prevents. 1 Utah 2d at 14-15,
261 P.2d at 930.
Second, the Court concluded that the Earnest Money Receipt and
Agreement, which did not require a sale as a prerequisite to
the broker's commission, entitled the broker to a commission
because he had produced a ready, willing, and able buyer:
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Defendant advances another proposition supporting the claim to its commission: That
the Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, having been executed after the listing agreement, and after the Johnsons had been accepted as buyers, superseded the former agreement; and that it expressly binds plaintiffs
to pay defendant their commission. It states:
"The seller agrees, in
consideration of the efforts of
the * * * [broker] in procuring
a purchaser, to pay the said
* * * [broker] the rate of commission recommended by the Salt
Lake Real Estate Board."

-

Defendant points out that under such an agreement all the broker is obligated to do is to
produce a ready, willing and able buyer and
*
that at plaintiff's request it exerted "efforts * * * in producing a purchaser * * *"
before, at the time of, and after the plaintiffs signed the Earnest Money Agreement and
contend that it follows as an elementary proposition that the plaintiff, having so agreed,
must pay. Plaintiffs, however, counter that
the prior listing contract calling for a
consummated sale, stands independent of the
Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, and is
not necessarily inconsistent with it. In
view of the language just quoted specifically covering the payment of commission for
efforts of the broker in procuring a purchaser (not in consummating a sale) the
writer is of the opinion that the defendant
is correct ±n this contention also, and that
for this additional reason judgment in favor
of the defendant for its commission is mandatory. 1 Utah 2d at 15, 261 P.2d at 930-31.

Lines 49 and 50 of the Earnest Money Agreement here contain a
provision virtually identical to that before the Court in Hoyt
The seller agrees in consideration of the efforts of the agent in procuring a purchaser
to pay said agent a commission of $28,500.00
of the sales price (Exhibit 2-P).
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Quite significantly to this appeal, the Hoyt Court reversed the
trial court's judgment against the broker and remanded with
directions to enter judgment against the sellers in the amount
of the broker's commission.
Another case quite similar to that at bar is Curtis v.
Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (1954).

There, the

broker procured from the sellers a listing agreement concerning
a motel property.

Thereafter, the broker on behalf of the pros-

pective buyers executed an earnest money agreement, which was
later executed by the sellers, upon the sellers1 terms but s u b ject to the buyers1 approval following their examination of the
motel abstract and operating statement.

Before approval by the

buyers, the sellers rescinded and the buyers sued for specific
performance.

In their suit for specific performance, the buyers

failed because the buyers1 agreement was conditional and no consideration had actually been paid by the buyers.
The broker then sued the sellers for his commission.
The sellers defended the broker's suit for his commission upon
the ground that the broker had failed to present an offer or
agreement that was binding on ready, willing, and able purchasers.

Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the broker was

entitled to his commission.

The Court recognized that the bro-

ker had not procured a binding contract between buyers and sellers, but reasoned that such a binding contract was unnecessary
to the broker's recovery because

(1)

the buyers were prepared
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to proceed on the sellers1 terms and did everything possible
to indicate their willingness to proceed, and

(2)

the sale

did not materialize because the sellers changed their minds and
refused to complete the transaction.
Under such circumstances appellants have fulfilled their part of the listing agreement
by having produced purchasers who were ready,
willing and able to buy the listed property
and are entitled to their commission. Such
were the terms of the listing agreement made
by the parties. There was no requirement that
a binding contract be entered into and for us
to add that requirement would be to make a
new contract for them. This we may not do.
As stated in 8 Am.Jur. Sec. 184, page 1097:
l!

0nce the broker has procured a person who is able, ready
and willing to purchase on the terms
offered by the owner, he is entitled
to commissions, even though the
failure to complete the contract is
due to the default or refusal of the
employer. 1 Utah 2d at 357, 267 P.2d
at 238.
Like the Hoyt Court, the Curtis Court reversed a judgment against
the broker and remanded with directions to enter judgment in
favor of the broker.
Based upon beth Hoyt and Curtis, the law of Utah clearly
requires only that the broker produce a ready, willing, and able
purchaser to recover his commission pursuant to the usual
"Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" -- particularly
where the seller withdraws from or fails to cooperate in consummating a sale upon his terms, the broker need not produce a binding contract to convey between purchaser and seller.
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Thus, even

assuming that, as the lower court found, Todd and Lignell?s
modification and execution of the Earnest Money Agreement constituted a counteroffer and not a binding contract, The Boyer
Company is still entitled to its commission if the Osmond Brothers were ready and able to proceed with the transaction as
reflected by the modified Earnest Money Agreement.

Based upon

the Hoyt case, if this Court concludes that Todd and Lignell
refused to cooperate and withdrew from the transaction notwithstanding the Osmond Brothers willingness to proceed, Boyer may
recover pursuant to the Listing Agreement notwithstanding that
it was conditional upon a consummation of the sale -- that condition is waived by Todd and LignellTs refusal to cooperate and
to proceed.

It remains to demonstrate

(1)

that the Osmond

Brothers were ready, willing, and able to proceed with the
transaction as evidenced by the modified Earnest Money Agreement and

(2)

that Todd and Lignell refused to cooperate to-

wards and refused to proceed with the sale.
A.

The Osmond Brothers were ready, willing, and able

to purchase the Shaughnessy Apartments on terms prescribed by
Todd and Lignell.

The Osmond Brothers imquestionably were finan-

cially able to proceed with the purchase of the Shaughnessy Apartments.

Costley, the Osmond Brothers' accountant, testified that

the Osmond Brothers possessed and had already earmarked the down
payment (approximately $400,000.00) and had the ability to make
the requisite mortgage payments to Northwestern even if the
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Shaughnessy Apartments had generated no income.

(T.122-23).

Todd testified that he told MacLeod that the Osmond Brothers
were considerably wealthier than he and Lignell. (T.48).

The

record contains no evidence casting any doubt on the Osmond
Brothers' financial ability to proceed with the sale.
The record is likewise clear that the Osmond Brothers
were ready and willing, even eager, to proceed with the sale.
Callister testified that he instructed Boyer to accept for the
Osmond Brothers the Earnest Money Agreement as modified by
Todd and Lignell and authorized Boyer to proceed with the closing of the transaction.
Osmond Brothers were

Callister further testified that the

!f

anxious to close11 and would be "delighted

to close11 the transaction.

When Boyer advised Callister that

Todd and Lignell did not desire to proceed, Callister even gave
thought to suing Todd and Lignell to enforce the modified Earnest Money Agreement.

(Callister Depo. 21-27).

Costley testi-

fied that the Earnest Money Agreement, as modified by Todd and
Lignell, was "perfectly all right," that he was not concerned
with Todd and Lignell!s changes (T.120-31), and that "[w]e felt
we had made a commitment on this when we signed an earnest money
agreement, and we were not at liberty to make a commitment on
another piece of property or sign another earnest money agreement until this one had been settled."
going testimony is uncontroverted.

(T.146-47).

The fore-

Boyer testified that he

advised Todd after the modification of the Earnest Money
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Agreement that the Osmond Brothers had accepted the same as
modified and were anxious to close the transaction as soon as
possible.

(T.184-85).

Todd, on the other hand, testified that

although Boyer told him that Todd and Lignell's changes to the
Earnest Money Agreement

f,

could be worked out,'1 Todd never asked

and Boyer never advised him specifically that the changes were
acceptable to the Osmond Brothers.

(T.21, 5 2 ) .

Todd so testi-

fied notwithstanding his inconsistent position discussed below
that he sought to arrange an assumption of the Northwestern loan
r—

by the Osmond Brothers.

(T. 26-28)'.

. .

......, r~i - •;-... :,,

The lower court made no finding as to the readiness,
willingness, or ability of the Osmond Brothers to purchase the
Shaughnessy Apartments on Todd and Lignell's terms, but the
evidence clearly establishes this fact and there exists no contrary evidence.

Although the findings state that the "counter-

offer was never accepted by the proposed buyers, The Osmond Brothers, in a legally binding fashion" (Finding no.11, R.195,
emphasis a d d e d ) , the evidence clearly establishes that the Osmond Brothers orally accepted the "counteroffer" and were willing and eager to proceed with and close the transaction.
B.

Todd and Lignell refused to cooperate towards and

refused to proceed with the sale.

According to Todd, only

three things remained to be done in order to consummate the
sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments to the Osmond Brothers.
51-54).

(T.

First, Todd maintains that he never was advised that
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the Osmond Brothers were willing to proceed with the transaction absent the leaseback provision that Todd and Lignell
deleted.

(T.51-52).

To believe Todd on this point, this

Court must disbelieve Callister, Costley, and Boyer, as noted
above, must believe that a broker having the prospect of earning a $28,500.00 commission would not communicate his buyer's
acceptance of his seller's offer, must believe that Todd in
five or six conversations with Beyer never once asked whether
the Osmond Brothers agreed to the leaseback deletion, even
though Todd acknowledges that this question was very important
to him, and finally must believe that Todd would seek to arrange
the loan assumption with Northwestern while not knowing or
trying to find out whether he and the Osmond Brothers had a
deal.

Todd amazingly stated in his deposition that the Os-

mond Brothers' position on the leaseback was discussed with
Boyer only once -- on November 17, 1973, when Todd advised
Boyer that he and Lignell would not sell the property.
Depo. pp.41-42).

(Todd

Even Todd was not categorical on this point,

acknowledging that Boyer at least told him that the leaseback
deletion "could be worked out." We submit that the evidence
clearly supports the fact that the Osmond Brothers did accept
Todd and Lignell's counteroffer, and the findings below are not
inconsistent with that conclusion.
Second, Todd indicated that some arrangement had to
be made with Northwestern to remove the doctors' dental
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building from the mortgage that Northwestern held upon both
the Shaughnessy Apartments and the adjoining dental building.
(T. 5.4, 157). The minimal, if not nonexistent, significance of
this problem in Todd's mind prior to trial is clear:

(1) Al-

though Todd and Lignell apparently quite carefully scrutinized
the Earnest Money Agreement, which contained no reference to
this "problem,ff Todd and Lignell took no steps in any way to
modify the Agreement to clarify or even point out the existence
of the problem.

(Exhibit 2-P).

(2)

During his deposition,

,wTodd was asked to state the various reasons why—the- sale of .••.« *Z^-**m«**
the Shaughnessy Apartments was not consummated, and he never
once made any reference to this nproblem.M
41-45, T.54).

(Todd Depo. pp.

(3) Todd did not mention to Boyer any problem

concerning a severance of the dental building from the Northwestern loan prior to the doctors' refusal to proceed with the
transaction on November 17, 1973.

(T.203-04).

Most signi-

ficantly, however, Todd himself testified that this "problem"
was really not a problem.

At trial, Todd indicated on three

separate occasions"that this problem was one that had to be
resolved with Northwestern and that MacLeod "indicated he was
willing to separate it [the dental building] out," that Mac
Leod indicated that "[i]t could be worked out," and that
Todd believed that "if the rest of the deal could be solved
that would not be a problem that couldn't be handled."
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(T.

30-31, 42, 49-50).

The second problem, therefore, was not

a problem.
Third, Todd indicated that MacLeod of Northwestern had
to approve the assumption by the Osmond Brothers of Northwestern's loan to Todd and Lignell.

(T.52-53).

The record in

this case reveals the uncontroverted fact that had Todd requested Northwestern1s approval of the Osmond Brothers' assumption of the loan, approval would have been granted.

MacLeod

in his deposition testified as follows on examination by counsel for defendants:
0,
I believe Mr. Rooker asked you
the question, and 1 will ask it again: Had
your company been asked to allow the Osmond
Brothers to assume that existing loan at the
rate of seven per cent interest in October
of 1973, would you have recommended - A.
If I had been asked to recommend
transfer of the loan in the unchanged amount
at an unchanged rate to the Osmond Brothers,
would I have recommended? I would have
recommended.
Q.

At seven per cent?

A.
At seven per cent. On a realistic basis, or on a pragmatic basis, I would
have had to have judged that my position
was certainly not any worse than it would
have been with Todd and Lignell. I was not
having any increased exposure in the loan.
It was being taken over on the reduced
balance.
The property had proven itself for
several years of operation, and I was receiving a substitution of financial responsibility considerably greater than what I
would have before.
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It would have been, it would have been
as I indicated earlier, a recommendation with
reluctance. And I think instead of a recommendation, it probably would have been an
acknowledgment of, you know, we are probably
going to have to approve this.
Q.
You would not have required then
any type of consideration coming back to
Northwestern for the assumption by the Osmonds?
A.
In full answer, I would have to
say, as I indicated earlier, that an approval of the thing would have been with reluctance. But if the request had persisted, I would have, on a pragmatic basis,
simply acknowledged that this is probably
something that we are going to have to go on,
Q.
Do you remember, in a conversation with Dr. Todd, having Dr. Todd ask you
that specifically, whether or not you!d allow them to assume it?
A,

I don't recall.

I do not recall.

Q.
Then you wouldn't recall what
your answer was?
A.
I don't recall having discussed
it, so I don't know hoxtf the answer could
have been presumed. (MacLeod Depo. pp.40-41).
What follows will demonstrate that the Osmond Brothers
were even willing,,to grant various incentives to Northwestern
to permit their assumption, but that Todd never seriously sought
to obtain Northwestern's approval of the Osmond Brothers' assumption; rather, Todd was attempting to negotiate a refinancing of
the Shaughnessy Apartments for himself and Lignell.

The policy

of MacLeod and Northwestern regarding negotiation of assumptions
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was clear and unbending.

MacLeod repeatedly reemphasized that

Northwestern would neither discuss nor consider any modification
of financing arrangements with their borrowers absent authorization from their borrowers, with whom Northwestern has privity.
(MacLeod Depo. pp.8, 10-11, 60-61, 64-65, 71). From prior dealings with MacLeod, Todd had knowledge of this policy.
Depo. pp.60-61).

(MacLeod

Thus, on each of the two instances when Boyer

telephoned MacLeod, MacLeod testified that he referred Boyer to
Todd and refused to discuss the matter with Boyer.

(MacLeod

Depo. pp.8, 38). MacLeod was firm in his recollection that Todd
had never instructed him to deal with Boyer on this subject:
Q.
Now, in answer to Mr. Bowen's question, you said that if there had been a request for a straight assumption by the Osmonds that had been pressed, you thought you
would have recommended it and that it would
have been approved; is that right?
A.
Yes, I have said exactly that.
If it had been persisted on a pragmatic
basis, I probably would have simply acknowledged it and recommended it, because it
would have been a transfer of position of
one borrower on the same loan for another.
And the existing borrower was one whose financial condition was coming into, at least
to my estimate of it at the time, jeopardy,
question, etc.
The other borrower, the assuming party,
was coming to me representing to be an entity of financial strength.
Q.
Now, who would that request have
had to come from?
A.
The request would have had to
come from the borrower.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q.

That is, Todd, specifically?

A.
From Todd or from a party that
Todd would have authorized us to receive
the request from.
Q,
And did Todd ever authorize you
to receive such a request from anyone other
than himself?
A.
Not that I recall.
firmly, footnoting it.

And I say that

Q.
If someone had persisted in such a
request, who would have had to have persisted?
A.
It would have had to have persisted from Todd or from a party Todd had
authorized us to receive the persistent in-~r-».-..: quiry from. (MacLeod Depo. pp. 64-65). -

—

v~ •< -.

There exists no question, therefore, that the power to arrange
an assumption lay solely in the hands of Todd.

Todd implicitly

recognized this fact by acknowledging that MacLeod had complained
to him about Boyer?s calling MacLeod regarding the assumption.
(T.75).
The folloxtfing evidence, established through Todd and
MacLeod, clearly indicates that Todd did not seriously seek to
arrange an assumption of the loan by the Osmond Brothers.

Todd

admitted that he never made a concrete proposal concerning assumption to MacLeod.

(T.79).

Indeed, Todd never even advised Mac

Leod that he and Lignell had agreed to sell the Shaughnessy Apartments to the Osmond Brothers.

(T.156).

MacLeod confirms this

fact in repeatedly pointing out that on each occasion that he
spoke with Todd generally about the assumption question, he left

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-40-

Todd with the initiative and awaited a concrete proposal from
Todd.

(MacLeod Depo. pp..32-35).

Todd admitted that even though

Boyer specifically requested that he seek in writing the consent
of Northwestern to assumption, and even though Todd promised to
write MacLeod a letter to that effect, Todd never wrote such a
letter.

(T,50-51).

On April 16, 1973, when Todd sought another

unrelated modification of his and Lignell's loan relationship
with Northwestern concerning the Shaughnessy Apartments, as one
would expect, he did so in writing.

(T.57, Exhibit 12-P).

Con-

trary to Todd's testimony, MacLeod unequivocally stated that he
did not recall Todd's having requested that the Osmond Brothers
be permitted to assume the Northwestern loan without modification.

(MacLeod Depo. pp.32, 25, 41). During the time that Todd

was communicating with MacLeod concerning this subject, Callister
and Costley advised Boyer that the Osmond Brothers would be willing to prepay the 1974 interest on the Northwestern loan, to increase the rate of interest on a larger loan, or pay additional
monies to Northwestern to induce the latter to allow assumption.
(Callister Depo. p*2$).

Todd testified that he recalled Boyer

advising him of the Osmond Brothers1 willingness to prepay in- \
terest and increase the loan interest rate, but Todd never passed
that on to MacLeod.

(T.52-53).

4/
Contrary to his trial testimony, Todd during his deposition
testified that he never presented MacLeod with any proposal other
than a pure substitution of the Osmond Brothers, because Boyer
never gave Todd any other basis. (Todd Depo. pp.36-37).
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The testimony of Todd, without more, conclusively establishes that he did not seriously seek Northwestern?s permission to allow the assumption.

Todd's recollection of his first

discussion with MacLeod in late October, 1973 was as follows:
He said, "Do you really want permission?11
And I said, "No, we really don^t. It is
a project we like and has been very successful." And he said, "There may be
another way, that won't be necessary to
do it. (T.155).
The "another way" mentioned by MacLeod was a refinancing by
Northwestern of the Shaughnessy Apartments.

Thus, during late

^October afid through November 15, 1973, Todd discussed with Mac-**"*4-*"-**-'*6:';
Leod a refinancing of the Shaughnessy Apartments by Northwestern
-- an objective obviously inconsistent with a sale of the property to the Osmond Brothers.
52-56).

(Todd Depo. pp.38-39, T.24-25,

During this same period of time, Todd was supposedly

seeking Northwestern1s approval of the assumption by the Osmond
Brothers.

We submit that the foregoing establishes that the

clear weight of evidence indicates that Todd and Lignell refused
to cooperate towards the consummation of the subject sale to the
Osmond Brothers.
On November 19, 1973, Todd sent to Boyer a letter stating as follows:
-

As I have indicated to you over the past
several weeks thru telephone conversations,
we have decided, for various reasons, not
to sell the Shaughnessy Apartments. (Exhibit 5-P, Exhibit "C" hereto).

Todd testified at trial that in mid-November, 1973 he advised
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-42-

Boyer that he and Lignell would not proceed with the sale because Boyer presented him with a "yes or no11 ultimatum; in
his letter, by contrast, Todd indicated that he had advised
Boyer for "several weeks" that he and Lignell had decided not
to sell the property.

In his deposition and at trial Todd con-

ceded that at least a "minor reason" in his decision not to sell
the property was a potential adverse tax consequence of such
sale amounting to $145,000.00.

(Todd Depo. pp.44-45, T.160).'

In any event, the foregoing makes clear that Todd and Lignell
did decide not to sell the property, and the readiness, willingness, and ability of the Osmond Brothers to proceed played no
role in that decision.
We respectfully submit that the facts of this case are
in every respect almost identical to those presented to this
Court in Hoyt:

In both cases the sellers and the broker entered

into listing agreements requiring a consummated sale to entitle
the broker to a commission; in both cases the sellers and the
broker subsequently entered into an Earnest Money Agreement not
imposing that prerequisite; in both cases the broker produced
a ready, willing, and able purchaser; in neither case did the
broker produce a binding, written contract between seller and
purchaser; in both cases the sellers refused to cooperate towards and to proceed with the sale.

The result that obtained

in Hoyt should therefore obtain here -- the lower court's judg-

-43-
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ment should be reversed with instructions to enter judgment
for the borker.
Only one material difference exists between this case
and Hoyt.

Here, Boyer as broker entered into the Listing Agree-

ment, while The Boyer Company as broker entered into the Earnest
Money Agreement,

Should the Court conclude that a technical

licensing defect precludes recovery by The Boyer Company under
the Earnest Money Agreement, Boyer should recover under the
5
Listing Agreement.

"

lT*7.r'~Z

7;

CONCLUSION

;;-

In its Memorandum Decision, the lower court concluded
that plaintiffs could not recover because

(1)

Boyer failed

to bring about a consummated sale of the property,

(2) The

Boyer Company was not a duly licensed broker,

the Osmond

(3)

Brothers did not properly accept Todd and Lignellfs counteroffer, and

(4)

the Earnest Money Agreement was ineffective

because another listing agreement was in effect.
The lower-court made no determination as to whether
Todd and Lignell failed to cooperate towards effectuating a sale

5/
Defendants will no doubt argue that Boyer cannot so recover
because the lower court nfound,f that all efforts in connection
with the Earnest Money Agreement were those of The Boyer Company.
(Finding No,16, R.196). Aside from the fact that absolutely
no evidence supports this "finding," Todd testified that he
paid no attention to any difference between Boyer and The Boyer
Company in connection with the Listing Agreement and the Earnest
Money Agreement. (T.56).
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other than through the findings prepared by counsel for defendants.

If, as we submit is clear, this Court concludes that

defendants so failed to cooperate and refused to sell, the lower
courtfs first and third grounds fail as a matter of law under
Hoyt.

With respect to The Boyer Company, in any event, the

first and third grounds pose no bar, since its commission under
the Earnest Money Agreement was conditioned neither upon a binding contract to sell nor a sale.
The Boyer Company, as the lower court found, was
licensed as a broker pursuant to well established practices of
the Real Estate Division.

Those practices reflect a defensible

construction of the relevant statutes, which are reasonably calculated to serve the evident statutory goals and should be upheld by this Court.

In any event, The Boyer Company should not

be penalized for complying with the practices of the Real Estate Division even if those practices are determined to diverge
from the statutory dictates.

Even if The Boyer Company was not

duly licensed, Boyer the individual as a licensed broker should
recover under the Lifting Agreement.
The lower court's fourth ground bears only brief mention.

Defendants and Boyer, the president and sole stockholder

of The Boyer Company, entered into the Listing Agreement.
Defendants and The Boyer Company, both with evident knowledge
of the prior Listing Agreement, entered into the Earnest Money

-45-
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Agreement.

From the course of events recited above, it is

clear that the Listing Agreement contemplated a later preliminary contract to convey involving Boyer, Todd, and Lignell
—

The Earnest Money Agreement effectuated that intent and should

be given effect.

Defendants testified that they did not distin-

guish between the two in connection with both the Listing Agreement and the Earnest Money Agreement (T.56), and for that reason neither should this Court insofar as the lower court's
fourth ground is concerned.

The fourth ground in any event

could not affect Boyerls right to recovery.

The judgment of

the lower court should be reversed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
MARTINEAU & MAAK
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EXHIBIT "A1

October 1, 1973

Mr. H. Roger Boyer
548 East South Temple St.
Salt Lake City, Utah

'

Dear Mr. Boyer;
This letter will authorize you to proceed with negotiations
for the sale of the Shaughnessy Apts. at 247 South 7th East St.
in Salt Lake City at a figure of $950,000.00, (Nine hundred fifty
thousand dollars) with a commission of 6% (six percent) of the
sales price due you upon completion and full payment of the
difference betxvTeen the mortgage balance and the sales price.
(approximately $437,541•88).
A

"•? The sale of this property is subject to the approval of
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, the holder of the .
permanent mortgage.
Our Dental Building is involved in the mortgage withMJorthwestern Mutual Life and it must be clearly understood that it is
not part of the deal and will be separated out and remain the
property of Todd and Lignell.
Sincerely,

BMT/jt
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•THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE."

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE
The BoyiTr Company

Salt Lake City

1

TO:

2

Name of Rrok?r Company
IN C O N S I D E R A T I O N O F your agreement to use your effort, to present this offer to the Seller. I / w c T

3

hereby deposit with you a, earnest money eh. sum of (S 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0

4
5

in the form of
CheCK
to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at:

251

,

h e

FlVe thoUSOnd a n d

f—=rX7i
South 700

1 :
East i n c l u s i v e

Oct. II

Ut>h

OsiTlOnd B r o t h e r ,

-19.

n o / 1 0 0

- p p y ^

r
i
o fproperty With

i

Ti
CarpOITS O n d a l l

rights of way for ingress and egress.

6

73

A Utah Partnership

.

Salt Lake

Salt Lake

Utah

11
12

City_
. C o u n t y , State o f including any of the following items if at present attached t o the premises: Plumbing and heating fixtures and equipment including stoker and oil tanks, water heaters, and burners,
electric light fixtures excluding bulbs, bathroom fixtures, roller shades, curtain rods and fixtures, Venetian blinds, window and door screens, linoleum, ail shrubs and trees, and any

13

other fixtures except

14

The following persona, property shall also be Included as.part of the property r . - * . - . . A l l

The tout purchase price nt

17

-

USed i n Operation

Of t h e

U n i t s for

,, 921,500.00 , Nine hundred twenty -one thousand five hundred and no/100 DOU^RS
•3 , W w . U U

shall be payable as follows: $.

which represents the aforedescribed deposit, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by you:

.when aeiIer.»pproves "'»• * 4 U 4 , 0 U U . U U

19 $.
20

j
equipment

cleaning, maintenance or other purposes, carpets, drapes, air conditioning, all appliances.

15

18

iNOne

o n

delivery, of deed, or final contract of

d
ir
assumption
w vc. itwomB
g i e rm
19~7T
' ° . and $
each month commencing u
» W ' » | ' m i of
m
J512,000.00 mortgage with Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company bearing interest at
^
7%. Offer made subject to ability to assume above mortgage or equivalent financing. -Ak^y
X i ' T
sf4«W ngrpas tn Uasa hadtLjxQp&fyz^mmJauYQr for period of three yeaf5=fogir$36;5Q0 per apnum '
•with Jew*! pnyiccpo^o.Y.raongas nnri.mnrtnnqe poymejftfcsu,
u

sale whi(ich shall be on or W„r»

23
24

, balance of t S e e

above

-together with interest \% paid; provided, however, that buyer at his option, at any time, may pay amounts in excess of the monthly

..see_akovg,
. . . r annum o n the unpaid
.

28

by the buyer herein assumed. Interest a
payments upon the unpaid balance, subject tLi the
- limitations of any mortgage or
„ contract
.

29

purchase price to be included in the prescribed payments and shall begin as of date of possession which shall be on or

portions of the

W « , O c t . 1 8 1 0 7 3 A i i n i k of !<„, a n d destruction
30 of property, and expenses of insurance shall be born by the seller until date of possession at which time property taxes, rents, insurance, interest and other expenses of the property shall
31 be prorated as of date of possession. AH other u s e s and all assessments, mortgages, chattel liens and and other liens, encumbrances or charges against the property of any nature shall
32 be paid by the seller except J N P J Q J L - .
___-__«____________.
33
The following; special improvements are included in this sale: Sewer H—Connected g . Septic Tank and/or Cesspool D . Sidewalk £5, Curb and Cutter g j Special Street
34 Paving fJJ. Special Street Lighting QJ, Culinary Water (City £^. Other Community System Q . Private Q (Legend: Yes ( x ) N o ( 0 ) .
3 J C O N T R A C T O F SALE O R I N S T R U M E N T O P C O N V E Y A N C E T O BE M A D E O N T H E A P P R O V E D F O R M O P T H E U T A H SECURITIES C O M M I S S I O N I N T H E N A M E O P

As directed

%A
37
38

This payment ia received and offer is made subject to the written acceptance of the seller endorsed hereon within .
approved the return of the money herein receipted shall cancel this offer withot damage to the undersigned agent.

One

. days from dale hereof, and unless s o

39
In the event the purchaser fails to pay the balance of said purchase price or complete said purchase as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of the
40 seller be retained as liquidated and agreed damages.
Her. and that n o verbal statement
41
It is understood and agreed that the terms written in this receipt constiute the entire Preliminary Conti
r agreed that execution of the final
42 made by anyone relative to this transaction shall be construed to be a part of this transaction unless incorporaj
.shall
abrogate thiL
thiL Earnest
Earnest Money
Monei Receipt and Offer to Purchase.
43 contractt ^
a l l abrogate

The Boyer Company
Broker Company
45

W e do hereby agree to carry out and fufill the terms and conditions specified above, and the seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title with abstract brought to date or at

46
47
48
49
JO

Seller's option a policy of title insurance in the name of the purchaser and to make final conveyance by warranty deed X Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y V Y Y Y W Y V v v y v v v v v v v v ^ .
In the event of sale of other than real property, seller will provide evidence of title or right t o sell or lease, it either party fails so to d o . he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing.
this agreement, or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
$ 9 8SOfl Hfl
T h e seller agrees in consideration of the efforts of the agent in procuring a purchaser, to pay said agent a commission of
<j/*.<J,«JV/W» \J\J
er0 0 f the sale price.
In the event seller has entered into a listing contract with any other agent and said contract is presently effective, this paragraph will be of no force^er effect.

/ - » / . 4b^~
/

Date/

BJO-UB.IT 2

Cosx^

8*£.
53

(State law requires brokers to furnish copies of this contract bearing all signatures t o buyer and seller. Dependent upon the method used, one of the following forms must be completed.)

54

I
I acknowledge receipt of *Jijw
iJipM
s<^
IS
.,/.•

J

A

copy gfjite
glj&e
/

RECEIPT
foregoing agreement"*
agreement"'bearing all signat
" /y
/

.. ~^<Lc.al> a y , / / /

Purchaser
I
oeuer / ^ ,\
,uate /
rurcnaser
1
U'
/j
/
'
' •
' Ji
^
Seller•* / sf
'
"
I personally / c a u s e d a final copy of ,the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed to the Q Seller, 2\ Purchaser.
.. by registered mail and return receipt is attached hereto.

\

*J\-4
d&MP/HU
APPROVED
OVEl FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION
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Date

EXHIBIT "C"

November 19, 1973

Mr. H. Roger Boyer
548 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Roger:
As I have indicated to you over the past several
weeks thru telephone conversations, we have decided,
for various reasons, not to sell the Shaughnessy apartments.
We appreciate your interest and regret that circumstances dictate a negative decision at this time.

Sincerely,

Todd
BMT/jt
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EXHIBIT
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